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1 Introduction
This article is an argument for a ‘universal social
minimum’, or a ‘social floor’ as a foundation for
citizenship. The universal social minimum aims to
serve a dual function. The first is to create a coherent
framework that responds to the increasing social,
economic and environmental vulnerabilities and risks
heaped upon most of us, but especially those living in
poverty. The second is to frame the arguments as a
political programme, wresting the issue from
technocrats and creating the possibility for political
vision and will.
Obviously as a response to vulnerability and risk, the
idea of a social minimum impinges on the social
protection agenda. For those with a comprehensive
approach to social protection, the universal social
minimum could be seen as a social protection
framework; for those with narrower approaches it
could provide a framework within which social
protection sits. The critical thing is that the social
policy measures aimed at addressing vulnerability and
risk are shaped from a human rights and social justice
perspective, and that they work together as a whole.
This article will lay out the justification for a social
minimum in human rights and social justice theory,
establish and define the social minimum and then
explore the synergies between the social minimum
and social protection.
2 The justification for a universal social minimum
2.1 Development in reverse
Social and economic policies are not keeping up with
the realities of vulnerability, risk and inequality as
they impact on the poorest. Human lives globally are
increasingly characterised by insecurity and
uncertainty. The fear and risk are magnified with
poverty. The benefits of economic growth do not
appear to be ‘trickling-down’; instead, a ‘siphoning-
up’ is concentrating wealth at the top and increasing
inequality.
This is not to write off the importance of markets
and incentives to generate wealth and stimulate
economic growth; it is simply to recognise that some
problems arise from the nature of the economic
system, rather than as unfortunate side effects. Thus
they are foreseeable and likely (as opposed to bad
luck and rare), and as such are someone’s
responsibility. Examples of ‘reverse development’
include: shifts to low-waged unregulated, casual jobs;
capitalist efficiencies creating over-supply of goods
and services on the one hand, and depressing
demand on the other; financial liberalisation
removing the tools to manage economic risks; trade
liberalisation forcing countries into global
competition before they are ready, leading to de-
industrialisation and dependence upon low-value and
vulnerable primary commodity sectors.
The systemic and predictable nature of many of these
risks and vulnerabilities challenges our assumptions
that all able-bodied adults can support themselves
through work, that being out of work is temporary,
that work pays a living wage, and that people living
in rural areas can support themselves in an
increasingly hostile market. Inclusion in the global
economy is not always what it is cracked up to be.
Social rights are not keeping pace with market
vulnerabilities.
2.2 Inequality
People living in poverty suffer an inequality ‘double
whammy’. First, they get a disproportionate share of
the bad things – insecurity, risk and hardship –
compared with the rest of the population. Second,
they get an inadequate share of the good things, like
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income. Globally, inequality is getting worse and this
matters because of its structural nature and
incompatibility with poverty reduction objectives.
Inequality directly impacts upon poverty, whether
measured in absolute or relative terms. From a purely
instrumental perspective, inequality matters both
because it distances people at the bottom of the
heap from opportunities for social and economic
advance and because it undermines the overall quality
and quantity of economic growth. Birdsall (2005)
warns that income differentials can aggravate
unfairness in the allocation of opportunities, the
functioning of the political process, and efforts to
improve the wellbeing of the least advantaged.
Economic power means the political power to
influence policies that institutionalise inequality. It is a
process which turns human rights into privileges,
public goods into commodities, and switches trade,
aid, and economic policy towards serving the
interests of the economically powerful, concentrating
income, wealth and political power. Townsend and
Gordon (2002) call this process ‘social polarisation’
and argue that this is often the critically missing
context in debates about poverty and social exclusion.
Social exclusion is increasingly being used to describe
‘poverty-generating’ processes in developing
countries. Economic, cultural, social and political
factors ‘deprive people of rights, valued goods and
services, and the opportunities to live in accordance
with their own aspirations with dignity and well-
being’ (Mander and Kumaran 2006). Such factors
include discrimination on the basis of race, class,
gender, age, physical ability, ethnicity and so on – in
other words, deprivation caused by arbitrary and
abusive relations of status and power. Tackling
exclusion means redistributing social power. A first
step in this direction requires the establishment of a
social minimum.
2.3 Poverty and human rights
Human rights are moral claims to equal and just
treatment. In comparison to the rest of the
population, people living in poverty are hugely and
disproportionately without the enjoyment of
human rights.
The International Bill of Rights and subsequent human
rights instruments and enforcement mechanisms
provide a powerful set of human rights standards, all
of which have a relationship to poverty (including the
right to social protection). But the connection to the
argument about a social minimum is not only in the
potential for litigation, or using human rights standards
and principles to inform the content of the social
minimum. The strong link to the social minimum is in
the foundational values of human rights, most
particularly autonomy, agency, and dignity.
Autonomy is the ‘classical’ foundational value in
human rights thinking. An autonomous person must
be free to rule herself, make her own choices and
set her own goals which are uniquely her own. A
closely related value is agency. It is no good being
able to set your own goals if you cannot act on them
– you must have the capacity to be an active agent in
pursuing your life’s plans and projects. To deny people
this freedom is to treat them as less than human.
Human rights provide those freedoms, including the
freedom provided by a basic degree of material
wellbeing and security, so that people’s entire lives
are not taken up with anxiety, desperation and the
task of physically surviving. Equal worth is also
reflected in the term dignity (self-respect and self-
esteem). A society that respects dignity is necessarily
committed to creating the social conditions to
guarantee dignity for all.
This short reflection on the foundational values of
human rights shows that civil and political rights cannot
fulfil their purpose if people are without basic needs:
… deprivation impedes the development of a whole
range of human capabilities including the ability to
fulfil life plans and participate effectively in political,
economic and social life … If basic subsistence needs
are not met … It also deprives society of the
contributions of all of its members. Thus both the
individual and society are impoverished by our
collective failure to ensure conditions worthy of the
dignity of people as both individual and social beings.
(Liebenberg 2005)
At heart, dignity requires us to focus on both the
individual nature of freedom and the duty of society
as a whole to redress the social, political and
economic basis of inequality and disadvantage. The
social minimum provides that redress.
2.4 Poverty and social justice
So far, we have reflected on the linkages between
poverty, vulnerability, inequality and human rights,
touching on issues of exclusion and power along the
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way. But the argument for a universal social
minimum requires a final piece: social justice. David
Donnison (1998) inserts the final piece well:
Exclusion, poverty, hardship, inequality, loss of
freedom … describe different ways of looking at
the same things, not separate phenomena. We
cannot understand poverty or measure it unless
we understand how it is related to the other
things in this list. It follows that the best measures
of poverty will not be single ‘poverty lines’ but
measures which tell us something about the
whole pattern of the society concerned.
Inequality and exclusion are ways of describing
that pattern, rather than just the situation of the
poorest people. The pattern reflects the character
of the whole society.
For Donnison, ‘the character of the whole society’ is
social injustice. All of the poverty-related concepts
discussed so far have their foundations in concerns
for social justice. Vallentyne (2006) argues that
justice is about what we morally owe one another as
a matter of right. Justice concerns itself with
inequalities of all kinds, be it the fairness of
processes, the distribution of resources (and rights
and opportunities), or putting right past wrongs. All
are relevant to issues of poverty and inequality, but
the most important to this discussion are questions
of distribution, since the issue at stake is the lack or
denial of resources, opportunities and rights of
people living in poverty.
The core questions are ‘to who is justice owed, what
are they owed, and what pattern of distribution is
owed?’ (Vallentyne 2006). To this we might add ‘how
are people to get what they are owed?’ – what
political programme will deliver social justice for
people living in poverty? The issue of ‘to who is justice
owed’ is usually bound by concepts of ‘citizenship’. The
key concern is for those excluded arbitrarily, whether
due to economic, social or political marginalisation.
What is the currency of justice? With what kinds of
goods and benefits is justice concerned? This issue is
at the heart of the social minimum. Some of the
main contenders are resources, primary goods,
capabilities, social/political status (respect) and
freedom (Vallentyne 2006). All theories of social
justice (including the justifications for human rights)
stem from a basic question: can we objectively
identify ‘primary goods’ whose value stems from
them being absolutely fundamental or basic to
human wellbeing? Social justice demands that an
individual respects and realises these human goods
not just for herself and her sake, but also collectively
for the whole community.
Amartya Sen’s capability approach argues that
‘primary goods’ are necessary but not sufficient.
Sen’s concern is that human beings can ‘be’, ‘do’, and
become what they would value, not simply survive
which is the implication of a focus on primary goods.
For capability champions, the currency of justice has
to be the freedom to achieve, or capabilities. A
desired ‘being’, ‘doing’ or ‘becoming’ requires both
the means to achieve and the freedom to achieve.
The primary goods and services that make up the
means to achieve include services like education and
goods such as income and assets. But the freedom
to achieve requires things like protection from
discrimination, positive social networks, respect,
autonomy, self-awareness and agency, political and
civil rights, and institutions that guarantee equal
treatment. If a just society provides the capability to
be fully human, then justice in practice must involve
distribution of resources (income and wealth), goods,
services, human rights, power and opportunities. For
Martha Nussbaum (2003), the concept of capability
must lead to a solid constitutional and political
programme that recognises the moral equality of all
persons and guarantees capabilities as rights. This
argument appears consistent with a social minimum.
2.5 The universal social minimum
Human rights and social justice thinking are both
concerned with actions to ensure that everyone has
an equal chance of living a life of dignity and fulfilling
their human potential, as well as considerations
about what we morally owe one another as a
matter of right. Both are rooted in ideas about what
is intrinsically important to each individual’s
wellbeing. Human rights demand that these things
are respected, protected, promoted and fulfilled in
order that each individual functions as a free and
equal member of society. Social justice demands a
fair share of these intrinsically important things and a
fair distribution of burdens and benefits in society.
The social minimum, while initially ‘prioritarian’, aims
progressively at universalism, and through engaged
citizenship at full equality of opportunity. Human
rights and social justice are for everyone, not just
people living in poverty. But social justice demands
prioritising the worst off.
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The social minimum must go beyond addressing the
most brute deprivations, and provide a floor of
dignity and a basic standard of living designed to
bring people to the point materially and politically
where, as capable citizens, they contribute to the
shaping of political and social goals. Deliberative and
democratic debate is thus an integral part of the
social minimum itself.
The social minimum, while not providing a complete
solution to fulfilling human potential and social
justice goals, must be a major step towards that goal.
Thus, the social minimum must comprehensively
address what this article has described as the
structural factors which make people vulnerable to
poverty and keep them vulnerable through lifetimes
and even generations:
? Human rights violations
? Social polarisation and inequality
? Insecurity and shocks
? Exclusion
? Market vulnerability
? Lack of political participation.
The social minimum would be a clear constitutional
and political guarantee which responds to these six
factors. To extend Stuart White’s (2004) definition of
the ‘civic minimum’:1
The social minimum is the basic means including
resources, opportunities, rights and power to lead
an adequately decent and dignified life, and to
participate and advance as a free and equal
member in society. 
This definition, in containing the idea of ‘progression’
and the idea of supporting people to the point
where they can exercise agency, establishes the
social minimum as a foundation for citizenship. Basic
needs approaches are insufficient to satisfy the
demands of social justice. If social protection cannot
take people beyond the physical interests shared
with animals, how is it truly underpinning the
flourishing of human potential?
The social minimum seeks to reduce and mitigate
inequality in:
? Resources: income and assets (wages, basic
income, income-generating assets such as land
and credit resources)
? Rights and access to essential services (free basic
education and healthcare, food security, housing,
and so on)
? Opportunities (jobs, training, skills, participation
in markets and social institutions)
? Power (decision-making, participation in policy
discussions and formulation, budget allocations, etc.).
3 The social minimum and social protection
Putting all of these arguments together, the social
minimum would seek to provide:
1 Protection from vulnerability and hardship,
through relief, safety nets, social assistance (child,
disability, old age benefits), public works and free
basic services (education, health, housing, nutrition).
2 Prevention of deprivation and smoothing of
production and consumption falls, through social
insurance, social assistance, public works and
employment guarantees and protection, and risk
reduction.
3 Security to take livelihood and economic risks
and promote opportunity, through a basic income,
access to productive and income-generating
resources such as credit, land, common property
resources, tenure security, knowledge and
extending social protection to the informal sector.
4 Freedom from the structural causes of
vulnerability, such as discrimination, stigma,
domestic and other violence, but also processes
of ‘commodification’ that make critical services
such as electricity and water unaffordable to
people living in poverty.
5 Transformation in social relations and expanded
democratic space, such that deliberation around
the social minimum and the shaping of economic
and social policy are constitutive of the social
minimum itself. If programmes within the social
minimum are to work, they must be accompanied
by the right to information, transparency,
participatory budgeting and auditing, popular
education on rights and entitlements, and so on.
The social minimum can find support in a wide range
of theories of justice and international human rights
agreements (White 2004). The social minimum is also
very close in conception (and content) to the ‘extended’
perspective on social security as expressed by the
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‘Report of the Committee of Inquiry into a
Comprehensive System of Social Security for South
Africa’ (Taylor Committee 2002), the anti-poverty
measures detailed in the Indian Government’s
‘Common Minimum Programme’ (Government of India
2004), the UN Commission on Social Development
(UNESCO 2001), ‘Transformative social protection’
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004) and the ILO’s
‘progressive universalism’. In addition, groups such as
the UK-based ‘Grow-up Free from Poverty’ coalition,
who are campaigning on social protection, recognise
the need to situate their priorities within a broader
transformative programme, including a social minimum.
The conception of the universal social minimum
resonates with the argument for ‘transformative
social protection’, which suggests both a ‘politically
live’ entry point for advocacy around the social
minimum (social protection policy), and a way for
‘social protection’ to grip the mainstream political
imagination. The social minimum can also find
justification in human rights standards (while not the
same thing as minimum core obligations), in that the
components of the social minimum are recognised
human rights. An argument could be made therefore
that the social minimum should itself be universal.
How the social minimum is applied depends upon
national context. Advocates of social protection
would do their cause well to open the civil and
political space for these broader debates.
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Note
1 See White (2004) ‘We define a “social minimum”
as that bundle of resources which suffices in the
circumstances of a given society to enable
someone to lead a minimally decent life’.
